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Abstract 
In Canada, the sale of sex for money was not illegal under the former legislative structure. 
Regardless, the laws making up that structure were challenged for constitutionality in two cases 
and were heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. Two vastly different decisions were delivered 
in the 1990 Prostitution Reference and Bedford decisions, with the latter case repealing the old 
sex work laws. The Canadian government drafted new laws in response to the repealed laws. 
Evidence suggests that the new model of sex work regulation is harmful and does little to address 
the constitutional defects identified in the Bedford decision. This legislative approach comes 
from the adoption of perspectives from a moral crusade against prostitution, and similar legal 
structures in other parts of the world. The shortcomings of the law, and the questionable 
framework it stems from suggests that the government must do more to meet the needs of sex 
workers in Canada. The examination of this topic raises several philosophical questions that 
might be considered in future research.  
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Prostitution in Canada: Examining Legal, Moral, and Theoretical Perspectives on the Issues 
 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered a decision stating that the prostitution 
laws in effect at the time were constitutional. Approximately 23 years later in 2013, that same 
Court delivered a decision stating the opposite, ultimately repealing the challenged laws. The 
Canadian government enacted laws to replace those struck down in the 2013 decision. This paper 
examines the rationale delivered for both the 1990 Prostitution Reference and Bedford decisions, 
and examines the effects the new laws enacted by the government have had. The evolution of the 
principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter are discussed and are suggested to 
have played a large role in the vastly different conclusions reached in both cases. Also 
considered are critiques of the new laws as well as research highlighting issues with a similarly 
structured law in Sweden. The foundation for where anti-prostitution morality stems from is 
discussed. An argument suggesting the unconstitutionality of the new laws is used to justify the 
conclusion that, should the new laws be repealed in a future Supreme Court decision, the 
government must re-evaluate its approach to sex work regulation. 
 The two Supreme Court cases examine the Criminal Code provisions regulating 
prostitution. They do so primarily under the context of s. 7 of the Charter. Both cases also 
address arguments against the laws through consideration of s. 2(b) of the Charter. While there 
is lengthy discussion regarding the s. 2(b) arguments, for the purposes of this thesis these 
arguments will not be examined in detail. For ease of reference, s. 2(b) and s. 7 of the Charter, 
and the Criminal Code provisions that were addressed in the 1990 Reference and Bedford 
decisions will be reproduced here.1 
                                                             
1 The following Criminal Code provisions were repealed or amended as a result of the Bedford decision. 
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Section 2(b) of the Charter states that: 
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms, (b) freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
communication. (Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, s. 2(b)) 
Section 7 of the Charter states that: 
Everyone has the rights to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. (Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, s. 7) 
Section 2102 of the Criminal Code states that: 
Every one who keeps a common bawdy-house is guilty of an indictable offence and 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Every one who (a) is an 
inmate of a common bawdy-house, (b) is found without lawful excuse, in a common 
bawdy-house, or (c) as owner, landlord, lessor, tenant, occupier, agent or otherwise 
having charge or control of any place, knowingly permits the place or any part 
thereof to be let or used for the purposes of a common bawdy-house, is guilty of an 
offence punishable on summary conviction. (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 210) 
Section 212 (1)(j) states that: 
Every one who (j) lives wholly or in part on the avails of prostitution of another 
person, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding ten years. (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 212(1)(j)) 
                                                             
2 Numbered s. 193 in the 1990 Reference case. 
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Section 213 (1)(c)3 states that: 
Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view (c) stops or 
attempts to stop any person or in any manner communicates or attempts to 
communicate with any person for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of 
obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute is guilty of an offense punishable on 
summary conviction. (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 213(1)(c)) 
Section 213 (2) defines a public place as: 
… any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, express or 
implied, and any motor vehicle located in a public place or in any place open to 
public view. (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 213(2)) 
Methodology 
This thesis uses a case study design. A limited number of resources were consulted to 
reach a conclusion regarding how sex work should be regulated in Canada. The literature review 
consists of summarizing the two central Supreme Court cases, followed by the consultation of 
various resources to answer the following question; why were the two Supreme Court decisions 
different? Following this, literature was examined to establish the background and critiques of 
the new sex work laws, ranging from a case study looking at a similar law in Sweden, to the 
discussion of where anti-prostitution sentiment may come from. 
This design has the following limitations. It does not allow for a definitive argument for 
the legalization of prostitution as it is limited in its scope and is not generalizable nor is it 
                                                             
3 Numbered s. 195(1)(c) in the 1990 Reference case. 
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scientifically reliable in its findings. The consultation of different resources, or a more 
comprehensive approach may present different conclusions. There is inherent bias in this study 
that guided the selection of resources in order to establish a one-sided argument. Nor are all the 
pieces of evidence regarding prostitution arguments, theories, legal frameworks, etc., provided. 
The summary of this research design was influenced by Labaree (2019, “Types of 
Research Designs”, “Case Study Design”). As this study did not involve any interaction with 
human subjects, no ethics approval was needed. This study also received no funding and was 
written in part for the completion of the Bachelor of Arts: Criminal Justice (Honours) program at 
Mount Royal University. 
Relevant Supreme Court Cases 
 The two cases central to this discussion are the 1990 Prostitution Reference Question and 
the Bedford decision of 2013. Summaries of the rationale delivered in both cases are provided 
below. In the 1990 Reference the majority rationale of Dickson C.J., the concurring reasons of 
Lamer J., and the dissenting judgement of Wilson J. are all summarized. In Bedford, there was 
only one decision, the unanimous majority decision delivered by McLachlin C.J., thus it is the 
only one summarized. Following this is a discussion regarding the similarities and differences 
between the two cases, as well as a discussion about the evolution of the principles of 
fundamental justice under s. 7, as these are argued to be the central factors influencing the 
different conclusions reached in Bedford versus the 1990 Reference. 
1990 Prostitution Reference Question 
 The questions brought forth by this appeal were whether sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of 
the Criminal Code were (either on their own or in combination with each other) in violation of s. 
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2(b) or s. 7 of the Charter (Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the criminal code (Man.), 
1990, p. 1124). 
Majority Decision delivered by Dickson C.J. (La Forest & Sopinka JJ.) 
 In writing for the majority, Dickson C.J. considers s. 195(1)(c) (the communication 
provision) to be a prima facie infringement of s. 2(b) of the Charter (p. 1134). However, he does 
not consider s. 193 (the bawdy house provision) to be an infringement of s. 2(b) (p. 1134). 
Ultimately, he believes the communication provision to be justifiable under s. 1, and thus is 
saved (p. 1134). He characterizes the legislative objective of the communication provision to be 
the dealing of solicitation in public places with the aim of eradicating the social nuisance that 
comes from the public display of the sale of sex (p. 1134). The Chief Justice disagrees with 
Lamer J.’s characterization of the objective4, saying it is too broad. Dickson C.J. says that the 
legislation does not directly seek to address the issues of exploitation, degradation, or 
subordination of women as it relates to prostitution (pp. 1134-1135). The legislation meets the 
interests of homeowners and businesses in dealing with the related nuisance. Justice Dickson 
deems the protection from nuisance to be a pressing and substantive concern for legislators, and 
that rational connection exists between the legislation and the stated purpose (p. 1135). 
Dickson C.J. states that the communication provision focuses on communication for 
economic intent, and that an economic interest as it relates to the selling of sex for money is 
nowhere near the core guaranteed freedom of expression protection (p. 1136). Dickson C.J. says 
that the legislation is not overly broad and refutes the argument that the legislation extends to 
areas where there will not necessarily be people present to witness the solicitation. He says the 
                                                             
4 Lamer J.’s characterization is discussed later. 
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legislation is not limited to dealing with the nuisance itself, but also the issues related to nuisance 
(drugs, violence, witnessing by children). Therefore, the legislation discourages prostitutes and 
their clients from concentrating in certain areas (p. 1136). 
While the legislative aim is to target nuisance, from a practical standpoint Parliament can 
only target individual transactions in order to meet the objective (p. 1136). The Chief Justice 
rejects the appellants’ argument that the legislation is too broad in its wording. The wording says 
that it is a crime if someone “in any manner communicates or attempts to communicate”. But 
Dickson C.J. points out that this phrase cannot be considered in isolation from the phrase “for the 
purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute”. When 
read together, the scope is narrowed. He argues Parliament needs to be granted some flexibility 
given the wide range of communication that can occur for the purposes of obtaining sexual 
services (p. 1137). He says that a less intrusive means of regulation could exist if the aim was 
solely to deal with street nuisance. However, since the focus is “… the general curtailment of 
visible solicitation for the purposes of prostitution…”, it is not unduly intrusive (p. 1137). The 
legislation meets the minimal impairment requirement in his analysis. Dickson C.J. says that 
because Parliament carefully considered alternative approaches, and ultimately determined this 
to be the best legislative approach; seeing as there is no such thing as “perfect” legislation, and 
assuming parliament carefully crafted the legislation to respect infringed rights, it is minimally 
impairing (pp. 1137-1138). 
Finally, with respect to s. 1, Justice Dickson finds that the negative effects of the 
legislation’s enforcement are outweighed by the positive outcome of the decrease in instances of 
nuisance associated with street solicitation. Thus, s. 195.1(1)(c) satisfies the requirements set out 
in the Oakes analysis and is saved by s. 1 of the Charter. 
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 Next, Dickson C.J. tackles the question of if the two challenged pieces of legislation 
(separate or combined) are in violation of s. 7 of the Charter. He finds that there is a clear 
infringement of s. 7’s liberty rights as the consequence for breaking the laws is imprisonment (p. 
1140). He rejects the appellants’ argument that economic liberty is infringed if prostitutes are 
prevented from practicing their trade. The appellants argue further that the security of the person 
interest of s. 7 is engaged, as the prevention of working their chosen profession does not allow 
sex workers to obtain the necessities of life. The appellants also submit that prostitution itself is 
not illegal, and that imposing regulations on a legal activity to the point where it is impossible to 
conduct the act is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice (p. 1140). Dickson C.J. 
considers the infringement of liberty by way of physical imprisonment to be the strongest 
argument, so he does not find it necessary to consider the economic liberty argument (p. 1140). 
The Chief Justice agrees that vagueness is a principle of fundamental justice but does not 
find the laws in question to be impermissibly vague (p. 1141). He points out that while the 
legislative path taken by parliament is convoluted, it is allowable. The requirement is that 
legislation respects the basic tenets of the legal system. Parliament is within their purview to 
send the message of disapproval of the sale of sex (p. 1142). Having found that neither section is 
in violation of the Charter, he dismisses the appeal (p. 1143). 
Concurring Reasons of Lamer J. 
 Justice Lamer writes his concurring decision and goes into much greater detail than 
Dickson C.J. does. For the sake of brevity, a very brief summary focusing primarily on key 
points will be provided. 
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 Lamer J. characterizes the objective of s. 195.1(1)(c) as two-fold. It indeed aims to deal 
with the nuisances associated with street prostitution (which Dickson C.J. agrees with). However 
it also serves the purpose of eliminating the exposure of prostitution to those most vulnerable of 
being swept up into an environment (he considers) inherently exploitative of and degrading to 
women (pp. 1191-1194). This characterization means the legislation deals with a pressing and 
substantive issue (p. 1195). 
Lamer J. also determines that neither the communication provision, nor the bawdy house 
provision are impermissibly vague, as the courts are able to provide sensible meaning to their 
interpretation (p. 1160, p. 1161). After a detailed discussion of precedent, he determines that the 
appellant’s arguments regarding liberty and security of the person do not stand (p. 1179). Justice 
Lamer finds that the communication provision is a violation of s. 2(b) of the Charter. He does 
not consider it necessary to determine if the communication provision in combination with the 
bawdy house provision violate s. 2(b) (p. 1189). Ultimately he reaches the conclusion that the 
communication provision is justified under s. 1 as it relates to the s. 2(b) violation (p. 1202). 
Dissenting Reasons of Wilson J. (L’Heureux-Dubé J.) 
 Wilson J. suggests that the communication provision seeks to eliminate the consequences 
of street solicitation (nuisance associated with solicitation) by dealing with the communicative 
act that brings the consequences forth, as opposed to dealing with the consequences themselves 
(p. 1205). She disagrees with Dickson C.J. and Lamer J. by saying that she believes economic 
expression is protected under s. 2(b) so long as it is an option that is legally available (p. 1206). 
She does not believe the bawdy house provision to be in violation of s. 2(b) (p. 1206). 
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 Justice Wilson summarizes the positions taken by the parties and interveners in this case 
as well as the two cases that establish the legislative objective of the communication provision. 
She categorizes the perspectives into three categories of widening scope; nuisance in the streets, 
social nuisance, and prostitution-related activities. 
The narrowest of the three interpretation of the legislation’s objective is described as the 
protection of the public’s right to use streets and sidewalks without being obstructed (p. 1207). 
 The next interpretation argued that s. 195.1 itself seeks to deal with the secondary issues 
that arise from street solicitation (noise, traffic congestion, trespassing, reduced property values, 
etc.), while s. 195.1(1)(c) specifically was created to deal with the communicative activity these 
harms stem from (p. 1207). Wilson J. notes that the objectives under the social nuisance category 
do not suggest that the intent is the eradication of prostitution. In fact, the Attorney General of 
Nova Scotia argued the intent of the legislation was not the elimination of prostitution, but rather 
to send the message of the “… undesirability of bringing prostitution into the public forum” (p. 
1208). 
The final interpretation was brought forth only by the Attorney General of Ontario, who 
argued the legislation was meant to deal with a broad scope of issues relating to prostitution 
including violence, drug addiction, crime, and the prostitution of young people (p. 1209). 
 While Justice Wilson agrees with Lamer J. that prostitution is a degrading way for a 
woman to earn a living, she does not believe that the objective of s.195.1(1)(c) is to deal with 
this issue (p. 1210). She concludes that the objective addresses the social nuisances relating to 
prostitution. While prostitution and solicitation themselves are not illegal, it is the visibility that 
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is offensive to the public and has harms associated with the public witnessing it, especially when 
it is witnessed by children (p. 1211). 
 Justice Wilson finds the nuisance resulting from solicitation is of pressing and substantial 
importance. It is rationally connected to the objective as well, as criminalizing the 
communication acts as a deterrent itself (p. 1212). When discussing the proportionality aspect of 
the Oakes test, she summarizes how the Attorney General of Canada argued the legislation acts 
as “time and place regulation”, to which many businesses are subject. It also serves to discourage 
prostitutes from conducting their business on the streets and encourages them to take their 
business to private properties. Wilson J. points out the contradictory nature of this submission in 
that the bawdy house provision prevents a prostitute from working indoors (p. 1213). 
 The legislation prevents communication or attempted communication in a public place or 
a place open to public view (including places the public can access by right or by invitation). 
Communication in a secluded area would still be illegal because someone may be around to 
witness it. Wilson J. says this goes beyond any meaningful concern over preventing street 
nuisance. She states that it is unreasonable to criminalize all expressive activity of a certain kind 
because it might cause a nuisance (p. 1214). The language of “in any manner communicates or 
attempts to communicate” is also too broad as it can include any type of conceivable form of 
human communication, including non-verbal communication. Justice Wilson presents a 
hypothetical worst-case scenario in which, under this provision, an innocent bystander could be 
arrested for hailing a taxi if their communication was misinterpreted as solicitation (p. 1214). No 
harm or nuisance needs to occur for this law to be violated. Since the objective was to deal with 
street nuisance, criminalizing a legal activity that harms no one does not meet this objective. The 
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infringement of rights outweighs the objective. In her view, the legislation does not meet the 
proportionality requirement of the Oakes test, and is not saved by s. 1 (p. 1215). 
 Wilson J. then examines the s. 7 challenge for both the bawdy house and communication 
provisions. Her analysis is based on the punitive nature of the legislation governing prostitution. 
She also makes it a point to re-emphasize that selling sex for money is not illegal. She says that 
Parliament’s decision not to criminalize prostitution itself indicates that punitive measures to 
deal with prostitution were not deemed to be appropriate (p. 1216). The potential for deprivation 
of liberty is what triggers the s. 7 analysis (p. 1217). 
 Wilson J. cites Justice Lamer’s words in B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (1985) that giving too 
narrow of an interpretation of the s. 7 principles of fundamental justice should be avoided. The 
narrower the interpretation the more likely s. 7 protected rights will be violated. This should also 
be avoided due to the extreme consequences deprivation of these rights can cause (p. 1218). 
Justice Wilson does not, however, believe the laws in question are impermissibly vague to 
warrant s. 7 violation (p. 1219). While both provisions limit what a prostitute can do, this does 
not mean they are vague (p. 1220). In her opinion, the communication provision infringes 
freedom of expression and a prostitute’s liberty interests. Because she concluded that the 
provision was in violation of s. 2(b) and not saved by s. 1, she says that a person cannot have 
their liberty deprived as a result of their exercising their constitutionally protected right of 
expression freedom (p. 1221). The bawdy house provision is not in violation of s. 2(b), so this is 
not an issue. Nor are the two provisions linked in such a way that the violation of rights caused 
by one provision causes the entire legislative scheme to be unconstitutional (p. 1221). In Justice 
Wilson’s s. 1 analysis, she says that the pressing and substantive need as well as the rational 
connection requirements are met. However, imprisonment for someone who is exercising their 
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constitutionally protected rights is not a proportionate way to deal with this issue. Thus, in her 
view s. 1 does not save this law (p. 1223). 
Bedford Decision (2013) 
 Like in the 1990 Reference case, the communication and bawdy house provisions were 
also challenged, in addition to the “living on the avails of prostitution” provision. The questions 
to be answered in this appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada were if the three provisions 
violated the Charter’s s. 7 security of the person interests, and if so could the infringement be 
justified by s. 1. It was also proposed that the communication provision in the criminal law was 
in violation of freedom of expression guarantees under s. 2 of the Charter (Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Bedford, 2013, p. 1102). 
Unanimous Majority Decision Delivered by McLachlin C.J. (LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, 
Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, & Wagner JJ.) 
 McLachlin C.J. begins her decision by pointing out that the appeal in question is not 
directed at determining if prostitution should be legal, but rather if the impugned pieces of 
legislation are in line with the Charter (para. 2). As previously mentioned, the section numbers 
for the communication and bawdy house provisions are different in this case and a summary of 
these provisions is provided on pages 5 and 6. The pieces of legislation under scrutiny are: s. 210 
(the bawdy house provision), s. 212(1)(j) (the “living on the avails of prostitution” provision), 
and s. 213(1)(c) (the communication provision) (para. 3-4). The Chief Justice argues that these 
provisions force prostitution into two legal categories: out-calls (where a prostitute meets a client 
at a designated indoor location like the client’s home) or street prostitution (para. 5). She points 
out that Parliament has the ability to regulate when, where, and how prostitution takes place so 
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long as it is constitutional (para. 5). The applicant’s argument is that all three provisions violate 
s. 7 security of the person interests as they prevent the implementation of safety measures to 
make their practice safer. They also argue that the communication provision is in violation of s. 
2(b), and that none of the provisions are saved under s. 1 (para. 6).  
 At the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Himel J. determined that the decision rendered 
in the 1990 Reference case did not prevent her from reviewing the constitutionality of the laws 
(para. 17). This was because s. 7 jurisprudence had evolved significantly between the two cases 
and there was a greater body of evidence present including research that was not available back 
at the time of the Reference case. Further, assumptions made in the Reference case may not be 
applicable in a modern-day context. Additionally, the “violation of s. 2(b) expression rights” 
argument presented in Bedford differed from the one presented in the 1990 Reference (para. 17). 
McLachlin C.J. says it is unnecessary to determine if the court can review the expression claim, 
as the entire case can be resolved in terms of s. 7 (para. 47).  
 The applicants argued that the three impugned provisions increase the risks associated 
with prostitution. Himel J. and the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the applicants on this 
point (para. 59). McLachlin C.J. agrees and states that the laws do not merely place limitations 
on how prostitution may be conducted, rather they place dangerous limitations on the practice of 
an already risky (but legal) activity. Limitations that prevent prostitutes from taking steps to 
protect themselves (para. 60). She also highlights a constraint this legislative scheme creates; the 
breaking of these laws places a prostitute’s liberty at risk, while the compliance with the laws 
places their safety and security of the person interests at risk (p. 1133, footnote #1). 
 In discussing the s. 7 analysis, McLachlin C.J. reiterates that the bawdy house provision 
divides prostitution into two legal categories, street prostitution and out-calls. The former is 
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severely limited by the communication provision (para. 62). The initial application judge 
determined that this provision negatively impacted safety, as the research had shown working out 
of a fixed location to be safer than answering to out-calls. This is further impacted by the living 
on the avails provision that prevents a prostitute from hiring a bodyguard or a driver to help with 
safety during out-calls. McLachlin C.J. agrees with this (para. 63). Working at a fixed location 
allows the implementation of measures to reduce the likelihood of violence. These include things 
like the presence of receptionists, body guards, assistants, and audio recording systems, among 
others. The bawdy house provision prevents this from happening (para. 64). 
The bawdy house provision also prevents street prostitutes from accessing safe houses 
where they can take clients. Not allowing these safe houses denies the most vulnerable class of 
prostitutes the ability to protect themselves, especially at a time when a serial killer such as 
Robert Pickton walked the streets (para. 64). McLachlin C.J. concludes that the bawdy house 
provision negatively affects security of the person interests and engages s. 7 (para. 65). 
 The living on the avails provision of the Criminal Code prevents prostitutes from hiring 
people to act as safeguards. The inability to hire bodyguards, drivers, etc., negatively impacts 
security of the person, and engages s. 7 scrutiny (paras. 66-67). The communication provision 
prevents prostitutes from screening clients at early stages for intoxication or propensity for 
violence (para. 69). It has the effect of displacing prostitutes to secluded areas to conduct 
business, increasing vulnerability (para. 70). The law also prevents prostitutes from discussing 
conditions upfront such as condom or safe house usage, significantly increasing risks (para. 71). 
McLachlin C.J. concludes that the communication provision also engages s. 7 analysis (para. 72). 
 The Attorneys General argued that s. 7 was not engaged because not enough evidence 
existed to prove a causal connection between the laws and the risks prostitutes face. They argued 
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that the prostitute’s decision to engage in prostitution is the causal link to the harms they face, 
not the laws. McLachlin C.J. disagrees with this (para. 73). She rejects the notion that prostitutes 
“freely” choose to engage in prostitution. She cites the experience of Terri-Jean Bedford (one of 
the three applicants for this case) who said she initially sold her body in order to have enough 
money for food (para. 86). Through financial means, addictions, mental illness, or the influence 
of pimps; street prostitutes exist as a marginalized population. A population that largely lacks the 
ability to make meaningful decisions not to engage in prostitution (para. 86). Justice McLachlin 
states that violence perpetrated by “johns” or “pimps” does not absolve the government of its 
role in making a risky (yet legal) activity more dangerous (para. 89). The argument that the 
actions of third parties and the prostitutes themselves are the cause of the risks, and not the laws; 
must fail in the Chief Justice’s view (para. 92). 
 In discussing s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice, McLachlin C.J. states that a grossly 
disproportionate effect on a single person’s rights is enough to violate the principles of 
fundamental justice (para. 122). The principles of fundamental justice compare the effects of the 
law with its objective, not with the law’s effectiveness. In the context of the s. 7 discussion in 
Bedford, the concern is if anyone’s life, liberty, or security of the person is denied by a law that 
is arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate (para. 123). She saves the discussion of 
broader social benefit the laws provide for the s. 1 analysis (para. 125). She also highlights that 
while it is uncommon for a law that violates s. 7 to be saved by s. 1, it is not impossible. If it is 
determined that the legislative goals are important enough, a s. 7 violation could be justified 
under s. 1. Therefore, it is important to still conduct the s. 1 analysis (para. 129). 
 Regarding the bawdy house provision of the Criminal Code, McLachlin C.J. rejects the 
Attorneys General’s argument that the objective of the law is to deter prostitution. The purpose is 
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to deal with the community harms associated with prostitution (para. 131). It cannot be 
interpreted to (on its own or in conjunction with the other provisions) deter prostitution as the 
legislative scheme allows out-calls and does not address prostitution directly (para. 132). She 
concludes that the negative effects on security of the person interests is grossly disproportionate 
to the stated objective (para. 134). The initial application judge determined that being allowed to 
move to a bawdy house increases safety benefits, and that complaints about nuisance from 
indoor prostitution were rare. The initial application judge also determined the law to be grossly 
disproportionate (para. 134). The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed and found the high homicide 
rates among street prostitutes made the effects of the laws disproportionate (para. 135). 
McLachlin C.J. agrees. She notes that while Parliament is allowed to create legislation that deals 
with nuisance, they cannot do so by adversely affecting health and safety (para. 136).  
McLachlin C.J. makes a powerful assertion in that: 
A law that prevents street prostitutes from resorting to a safe haven such as Grandma’s 
House while a suspected serial killer prowls the streets, is a law that has lost sight of its 
purpose. (Bedford, 2013, para. 136) 
 McLachlin C.J. cites Cory J. in the Supreme Court’s decision in Downey (1992) that the 
objective of the living on the avails of prostitution provision is to deal with pimps and the 
exploitative conduct they engage in (as cited in para. 137). Lower courts determined this 
provision to be overbroad in that it can render non-exploitative relationships liable (receptionists, 
bodyguards, drivers, etc.), thus it is also grossly disproportionate as it negatively affects the 
safety of a prostitute (para. 139). McLachlin C.J. agrees that it is overbroad (para. 140). She then 
finds it unnecessary to determine if the provision is grossly disproportionate (para. 145). 
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 McLachlin C.J. cites former Chief Justice Dickson in that the objective of the 
communication provision is not the elimination of prostitution, but the removing of it from 
public view to curb the nuisance street prostitution can contribute to (Prostitution Reference, 
1990; as cited in para. 147). It is grossly disproportionate in its effects in relation to its objective 
of preventing nuisance (para. 159). 
McLachlin criticizes the Ontario Court of Appeal’s approach to analyzing this provision. 
She says they were in error to criticize the application judge’s weighing of the legislative 
objective even though it was in line with jurisprudence established in the Prostitution Reference 
case (para.151). The lower appeal court erred in inflating the objective of the legislation to 
include the curbing of drug trafficking and other related crimes when Dickson C.J. specifically 
indicated these factors not to be a part of the objective (para. 152). It also incorrectly accused the 
application judge of making her decision based on anecdotal evidence and her own common 
sense, when the evidence had been supplied by prostitutes’ own accounts as well as evidence 
provided by experts (para. 154). 
In continuing her objection to the appeal court’s decision, McLachlin C.J. states that the 
appeal court ignored the reality that the communication provision has the effect of displacing 
prostitutes to isolated locations (para. 155). The Chief Justice also rejects the appeal court’s 
majority position that the application judge was incorrect in her assessment of the impact of this 
provision. A hypothetical analysis was offered by the appeal court, where some clients may pass 
the initial communicative screening stage and later become violent, or a prostitute may be too 
drunk, high, or desperate for money to say no (para. 157). While this scenario is possible, the 
Chief Justice suggests, it does not minimize the law’s effects on the criminalization of 
communication. McLachlin C.J. argues that “[if] screening could have prevented one woman 
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from jumping into Robert Pickton’s car, the severity of the harmful effects [of the legislation] is 
established” (para. 158). It is also interesting to note that in the the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
decision, blame was ascribed onto the prostitute’s lifestyle choice or financial situation, 
suggesting it to be the prostitute’s own issues that place them at risk. This could be argued to be 
an extremely disturbing narrative for a higher court to present. 
 The appellants did not strongly argue in favor of a s. 1 justification, thus McLachlin C.J. 
does not deem it necessary to do a full s. 1 analysis. She does however address an argument 
made by the Attorneys General that she believes to be more appropriate to analyze under s. 1 
instead of s. 7 (para. 161). It was argued that the living on the avails of prostitution provision 
needed to be broad in order to deal with exploitative relationships in all its forms. Justice 
McLachlin notes that in attempting to capture a pimp masquerading as a non-exploitative person, 
a driver, receptionist or an accountant could also be captured and held liable under the law; 
therefore, making the law not minimally impairing. Nor are the positive effects of protection 
from exploitative relationships able to outweigh the adverse effects of reduced safety (para. 162). 
 McLachlin C.J. concludes that all three provisions fail the s. 1 analysis (s. 163). She 
dismisses the appeals and allows the cross appeals. It is found that s. 210 in relation to 
prostitution, as well as ss. 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c) are in violation of the Charter (para. 164). She 
orders a suspended declaration of invalidity for one year (para. 169). This would leave the 
provisions in effect for one year, giving Parliament time to consider alternative legislation, or to 
take no action at all. 
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Discussion: Supreme Court Decisions and the Principles of Fundamental Justice 
A question that arises from examining these two cases is why did Bedford (2013) have 
such a different outcome than that of the 1990 Reference? There are two clear reasons for this. 
The first is that the nature of the arguments were different in each case. In the 1990 Reference, 
the argument was that the bawdy house and communication provisions were in violation of s. 7 
liberty interests and s. 2 freedom of expression interests. The liberty interests were argued from 
the perspective of sex worker’s economic liberty, which ultimately was determined to not be a 
protected interest under s. 7. The communication provision was found to violate expression 
guarantees, but it was determined to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. Both provisions were 
argued to be unconstitutional on the basis of vagueness, however this argument failed. Stewart 
(2012) suggests that proving a law to be impermissibly vague is difficult, as the courts provide 
content through interpretation and application, and the requirement of sufficient precision is easy 
for legislation to follow (pp. 128-129). 
In Bedford, the argument focused primarily on how the three provisions (bawdy house, 
living on the avails, and communication) adversely affected sex worker’s s. 7 security of the 
person interests as they related to safety. While freedom of expression rights were argued to be 
violated as well, the egregious violations of safety interests rendered a discussion surrounding 
expression interests unnecessary. It must be noted that while the nature of the arguments were 
different, the decision delivered in Bedford was additionally influenced by the evolution of s. 7 
jurisprudence and the evolution of the principles of fundamental justice. 
This leads into the second primary difference between the two cases. Between 1990 and 
2013, the courts gained new understanding into how to interpret and apply the principles of 
overbreadth, arbitrariness, and gross disproportionality. Stewart (2012) suggests that in the early 
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1980s, the principles of fundamental justice were likely considered as principles of procedural 
fairness or natural justice. Meaning that the rights to procedural fairness would be protected 
when an individual’s life, liberty, or security of the person was affected (p. 99). The principles 
could be expanded to include substantive principles as well (p. 100). The Supreme Court of 
Canada has held that the principles of fundamental justice were not to be interpreted by the 
intentions of the original drafters of the Charter, suggesting that the principles have the potential 
to evolve and be interpreted accordingly (p. 100). They are necessary for a system of justice that 
recognizes and acknowledges the “… dignity and worth of the human person and the rule of 
law” (Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, 1985; as cited in Stewart, 2012, p. 100). The principle of 
overbreadth was not recognized until 1994 in the Heywood case. Arbitrariness was not 
recognized until 1993 in the Rodriguez case. And in 2003, the principle of gross 
disproportionality was recognized as a principle of fundamental justice in the Malmo-Levine case 
(Hudson & Meulen, 2013, p. 128). 
The principle of overbreadth became recognized as a principle in R v Heywood (1994). 
Cory J. described this principle as looking if the means used to achieve a legislative objective are 
necessary. If the means are determined to be broader than necessary, it violates this principle as 
Charter protected rights are violated for no reason. In Heywood, the legislation in question 
violated the overbreadth principle meaning it also failed the minimal impairment piece of the 
Oakes test under s. 1 (Heywood, 1994; as cited in Stewart, 2012, pp. 133-134). It is argued that 
the overbreadth principle as a standard (as opposed to that of gross disproportionality) requires 
legislation be crafted with greater precision (pp. 135-136).  
According to Stewart (2012), successful challenges of arbitrariness are uncommon. This 
is because determining a law to be arbitrary sends the message that the legislature responsible for 
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the law had a reasonable objective in mind but took an irrational path to achieve that goal. The 
courts are hesitant to suggest that the legislature has acted irrationally (p. 136). A law can be 
arbitrary if it is found to be unnecessary to achieve the objective in question, or if it is not related 
or connected to the legislative objective (p. 136). In Morgentaler (1988), the law in question was 
struck down as a violation of s. 7. There was a lack of agreement among the majority as to which 
principle of fundamental justice was violated. Though the reasons provided seem to suggest that 
the law was found to be arbitrary (pp. 139-140). In PHS Community Services Society (2011) the 
Court struck down the decision made by the Federal Minister of Health not to renew a “safe 
injection” site’s exemption from the trafficking and possession provisions under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). This was found to be arbitrary as the evidence had shown a 
decrease in overdose related deaths without an increase in crime within the area. The Minister’s 
denial of renewal was not connected to the objectives of the CDSA in protecting health and 
safety, and was in fact contrary to the objectives (pp. 142-143). 
Gross disproportionality occurs when a law’s negative effects are grossly 
disproportionate the positive ones. If a law has positive effects that are in line with its legislative 
objective, but the adverse effects are so extreme as to outweigh the positive effects, then the law 
violates the principle against gross disproportionality (Stewart, 2012, p. 149). At the time of this 
publication, it is highlighted that the Supreme Court had never invalidated a law on these 
grounds, as it is rare for a Charter applicant to successfully demonstrate that a law fails the 
standard of gross disproportionality, and not mere disproportionality or overbreadth (p. 149). 
Social science evidence is usually needed to assess the effectiveness of a law in achieving 
its objectives (Stewart, 2012, p. 143). However, the more a court is willing to defer to the 
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legislature’s position that a law will have beneficial effects related to the specified objectives, the 
less weight social science evidence will have (p. 143). 
What this suggests is that the three principles central in Bedford did not exist or have 
deep enough meaning in 1990 to have had an effect on the outcome of the 1990 Reference. 
While it could be argued that these two decisions were different due to being products of their 
respective time periods, had the principles of fundamental justice not evolved, it is difficult to 
say whether or not the three challenged provisions would have been struck down. Or perhaps 
they would still have been struck down, but through using a different path of legal analysis. 
Hudson and Meulen (2013) discuss how in the 1990 Reference, the stakes for the 
Supreme Court’s decision were high. It had to decide whether to provide a constitutional right to 
engage in sex work, or to leave the laws as they were. There was a stronger emphasis on 
ideological debate as empirical evidence was not accessible. In Bedford, as stated previously the 
arguments made had a different focus. The arguments were centred on the government’s role in 
allowing sex workers to be subjected to violence, arguments that were made possible by the 
existence of empirical research in applicable areas. It is also suggested that events such as the 
high rates of violence and murder sex workers experienced in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside 
influenced the willingness to examine the failures of the government in relation to sex work (pp. 
141-142). 
However, it is important to note that the decision in Bedford (and the analysis of the 
principles of fundamental justice), does not suggest that sex work should be regulated, 
decriminalized, or legalized. Rather it suggests that the laws themselves and the ways they were 
enforced contributed to higher risks of violence and exploitation experienced by sex workers 
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(Hudson & Meulen, 2013, p. 117). This is the argument made by the Attorneys General that 
McLachlin C.J. rejects. She disagrees with the argument that the central claim of the applicants 
in the Bedford case was the right to vocational safety and the right to engage in a risky activity 
(Bedford, 2013, para. 81). The applicants were not asking for the government to make sex work 
safer, rather they were asking the government to remove legislation that made sex work more 
dangerous (para. 88). This is important to keep in consideration when discussing Parliament’s 
response to Bedford’s invalidating of the three provisions. 
Bill C-36: Parliament’s Response 
 In 2014, Parliament enacted Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited 
Persons Act (PCEPA). This piece of legislation “… treats prostitution as a form of exploitation 
that disproportionately impacts women and girls.” (Department of Justice, 2018, “Fact Sheet”, 
para. 1). The objectives of PCEPA are stated to be the protection of those selling their own 
sexual services; the protection of communities and children from the harms associated with 
prostitution; and the reduction of the demand and occurrence of prostitution (“Fact Sheet”, para. 
1).  
The preamble to the information sheet says the following: 
The new criminal law regime seeks to protect the dignity and equality of all Canadians 
by denouncing and prohibiting the purchase of sexual services, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others, the development of economic interests in the sexual exploitation 
of others and the institutionalization of prostitution through commercial enterprises, 
such as strip clubs, massage parlours and escort agencies that offer sexual services for 
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sale. It also seeks to encourage victims to report incidents of violence to the police and 
to leave prostitution. (Department of Justice, 2018, “Fact Sheet” para. 2). 
The new offences under PCEPA are meant to modernize old laws (Department of Justice, 
2018, “Prostitution Offences”). There is the purchasing offence which makes it an offence to 
obtain sexual services for renumeration (a fee) or to communicate for that purpose (s. 286.1 of 
the Criminal Code). Individuals who sell their own sexual services are not criminally liable (ss. 
286.5(2)) (“Purchasing Offence”, para. 1). There is the advertising offence which makes it an 
offense to advertise the sale of sexual services (s. 286. 4) with the selling or the advertisement of 
one’s own sexual services being protected from criminal liability (ss. 286.5(1)(b) and ss. 
286.5(2) respectively) (“Advertising Offence”, para. 1). There is the material benefit offence 
which makes it an offense to obtain financial benefit or otherwise from the commission of the 
purchasing of sexual services (s. 286.2) with the selling of one’s own sexual services not being 
held liable (“Material Benefit Offence”, para. 1). The procuring offence makes it an offence to 
procure someone else to provide or offer sexual services (s. 286.3) (“Procuring Offence”, para. 
1). Finally, there is the communicating offense which makes it an offense to communicate for the 
purposes of obtaining or offering sexual services in a public place next to a school ground, 
playground, or daycare (ss. 213(1.1)) (“Communicating Offence”, para. 1). PCEPA also includes 
various offences related to sex trafficking (“Trafficking in Persons Offences”).  
Issues with Bill C-36 and Similar Laws: Morality, Functionality, and Constitutionality 
 Stewart (2016) points out that the laws under Bill C-36 were inspired by the Nordic 
model of regulating sex work. A model in which the purchaser of sex is criminally responsible 
but the seller is not. However, Bill C-36 does not have a section that absolves a sex worker of 
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any criminal liability. Instead it has section 286.5(2) which says that no one shall be prosecuted 
for “… aiding, abetting, conspiring or attempting to commit…” any of the aforementioned 
offences in the selling of their own sexual services. Stewart (2016) argues that this implies a sex 
worker to be guilty of these offences, hence the need for a section granting prosecutorial 
immunity. He also explains how the sex worker would be criminally liable under this law as 
many of the prohibited acts are aided or abetted by the sex worker selling to a potential customer 
(p. 74). Sex workers could be prosecuted for recommending a client to another sex worker, thus 
making it criminal for sex workers to work together (p. 75). 
At issue is how easily issues of criminal liability arise under this legislative model, as 
well as the fact that the law sends the message to sex workers that their acts are criminal, but not 
acts they can be prosecuted for (Stewart, 2016, p. 76). The objectives of the legislation are said 
to be the denouncing of prostitution, and the response to the constitutional defects identified in 
Bedford. Stewart (2016) argues that these two policy objectives are so fundamentally in 
opposition that it is hard not to expect constitutional issues to arise (p. 71). 
 From a different perspective, it is argued that Bill C-36 operates under the assumption 
that sex work is inherently dangerous, violent, and exploitative. An assumption necessary for the 
law to be more than just a regulation on morality (Bruckert, 2015, p. 1). When considering how 
most violence against sex workers takes place on the street level, and the fact that most sex work 
takes place indoors; examining sex work through a lens of paid labor becomes important. It 
would seem outlandish to suggest that nothing could be done to deal with health and safety 
concerns in the context of any other occupation, but assuming “… that sex work is inherently 
violent erases the need to…” address these issues for sex workers (Bruckert, 2015, pp 1-2, 
emphasis in original). 
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The inherent exploitation attitude fits with the mandatory victim status that gets ascribed 
to sex workers, where they must be under the control of pimps, addicted to drugs, or so mentally 
challenged that they would participate in the sex industry (Bruckert, 2015, p. 2). “Questions of 
consent and agency are rendered irrelevant, and we are left with incompetent subjects in need of 
rescue rather than rights” (p. 2). The defining of sex workers as victims does nothing to address 
the underlying issues of gender, race, or class inequalities that can push people to engage in sex 
work. Criticism is given towards to government’s pledge to allocate twenty-million dollars to 
law enforcement and agencies that work to “save” “victims” from the inherently dangerous trade 
of sex work. Victims and women who want to leave sex work are championed, while sex 
workers speaking of the law’s harms are dismissed (p. 2). 
Conservative Senator Donald Plett is credited in saying that the government does not 
want to make sex work safe, but to eradicate prostitution, claiming this to be the central intent of 
the bill (Bruckert, 2015, p. 3). Bruckert suggests that feminists have fought for a long time to 
respect a woman’s right to make decisions about her body, and this is the reason they fight 
against politics that seek to protect women by limiting their freedoms (2015, p. 3). 
 But where does the assumption of sex work being inherently dangerous and exploitative 
come from? Weitzer (2007) argues the presence of a moral crusade against prostitution. A 
crusade with claims that are unverifiable and non-empirical (p. 447). This perspective presents 
prostitution as a social problem. A claim that only exists as a problem due to claims made by 
crusade supporters and may not be conducive to reality. It presents this social problem as an 
absolute evil, with the agenda of eliminating prostitution represented as just. The moral crusade 
raises public concern and lobbies politicians into action. Action can range from harshening 
punishments for engaging in these “evil” acts, or the criminalizing of acts previously legal (p. 
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448). The issues are presented in dramatic ways, to horrify the public and justify the harsh 
methods used to combat them. This perspective views the issues as black and white; there is a 
right or a wrong answer with no room for debate or discussion. The claims cited are over-inflated 
and not verifiable by available evidence or research (such as numbers of victims) (p. 448). 
Sex work is presented as an inherently evil and dangerous form of exploitation that is 
always harmful. It is not the same as other types of work, and it can never have policies or 
practices implemented to advance the interests of the workers themselves (Weitzer, 2007, p. 
451). The view that prostitution erodes the very fabric of social morality is prominent its 
arguments (p. 451). Argued is that prostitution is a form of violence itself, as opposed to an 
activity that can have violence present. Sexual acts are presented as degrading and violent, and 
the line between voluntary participation and trafficking is blurred. Claims that are also 
unverifiable (pp. 451-452). People who make the decision to enter into and stay within sex work 
are dismissed by supporters of these claims, as their stories are in direct opposition to the 
crusade’s claims (p. 453). The crusade attempts to justify its conflation of sex work and 
trafficking with the ultimate goal of eliminating trafficking, which supporters argue prostitution 
is the root cause of. Claims have been made that most sex workers started out as trafficked. A 
claim not supported by research (pp. 454-455).  
The differences between sex work and trafficking are important as they are centred on 
individual agency. The claim that sex work and trafficking are the same thing ignores the choice 
made by women to sell sex (for numerous reasons, not all of them economic or financial) thus 
abolitionists operate from a moral framework separate from that of the women they claim they 
want to save (Butcher, 2003, p. 1983).  The crusade has described sex trafficking as having 
reached epidemic levels, relying on shock factor to garner support (Weitzer, 2007, p. 455). 
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Legalization is rejected, for its role in a “guaranteed” increase in prostitution/trafficking, as well 
as for the complacency the state demonstrates in allowing the “degrading” practice of 
prostitution to continue (p. 456). Weitzer points out that (at the time of publishing in 2007) no 
causal link between increased amounts of prostitution and its legalization has been shown (p. 
457). If these claims are supported by the government, then the crusade becomes 
institutionalized. Forms of institutionalization can range from merely consulting with anti-
prostitution activists to the enacting of legislation in line with their goals (p. 458). Harsher 
penalties against prostitution appear more justified when it can be intrinsically linked to sex 
trafficking (p. 466). 
 Bill C-36 is characterized as an abolitionist approach to the regulating of sex work 
(Galbally, 2016, p. 2). Its foundation is rooted in the claim that prostitution is inherently 
exploitative, similar to the moral crusade’s claims as discussed by Weitzer (2007). This 
foundation prevents Bill C-36 from adequately dealing with the human rights issues5 sex workers 
experience (Galbally, 2016, p. 3). It is conceded that the radical feminist views against 
prostitution are helpful in identifying underlying constructs that subjugate women. However, 
when these views are reproduced through law, they strip women of the agency to make their own 
decisions when it comes to sex work (p. 3). The sex worker becomes the victim who must be 
saved. Thus, this becomes the only appropriate form of intervention. The need for improvement 
of conditions within sex work is ignored (p. 4). A critique of the abolitionist perspective is that it 
dismisses the diverse experiences sex workers have lived, as well as ignores the structural and 
systemic barriers that can push people into sex work (p. 12). 
                                                             
5 “Human rights” likely refers to the s. 7 security of the person rights that were identified in Bedford as being 
negatively affected by the old legislative scheme. 
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 As mentioned earlier, Stewart (2016) identifies the two main policy objectives of Bill C-
36 as being the denouncing of prostitution, as well as the responding to the issues the old laws 
faced as highlighted in Bedford. He expects there to be a constitutional challenge to Bill C-36 at 
some point in the future. In fact, groups representing the interests of sex workers asserted that the 
laws were unconstitutional, for reasons ranging from deliberate contempt of the Supreme Court 
by the Harper government, to the unlikeliness of the new laws doing much to help sex workers, 
ultimately failing to fulfil the objective of responding to Bedford (pp. 70-71). 
The laws may be unconstitutional, but those reasons may not be immediately obvious. 
This is because the law responds to Bedford in two ways (Stewart, 2016, p. 71). 
This first is the denouncing and deterring of prostitution, as opposed to the handling of 
issues of nuisance that the old laws did. It is suggested that the objective of denouncing and 
deterring prostitution is a constitutionally valid objective, one that a court would be hesitant to 
say otherwise. This means that for a s. 7 claim, the negative effects of the laws will be weighed 
against a potentially more serious objective (Stewart, 2016, p 71). 
The second way Bill C-36 responds to Bedford is by specifically addressing the safety 
issues raised in Bedford and decriminalizing aspects of sex work that were illegal under the old 
legislative regime (Stewart, 2016, p. 71). 
Stewart (2016) argues that considered separately, these two approaches appear to be valid 
under the Charter. However, the two approaches are fundamentally in opposition to each other, 
so much so that they will create arbitrary and grossly disproportionate effects on sex worker’s 
security of the person interests. One side criminalizes prostitution, while the other tries to 
improve safety conditions for sex workers themselves; “In practice, these two objectives are 
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likely to frustrate each other, and that frustration generates a plausible constitutional argument 
against Bill C-36” (Stewart, 2016, p. 71). 
When looking at the specifics, the new law responds to Bedford by repealing the bawdy 
house provision entirely, replaces the living on the avails provision with the material benefit 
provision, and modifies the communicating provision to be narrower in terms of how sex 
workers could be prosecuted. These approaches do not fit well with the punitive framework Bill 
C-36 presents (Stewart, 2016, p. 76). The material benefit provision makes it nearly if not 
entirely difficult to conduct indoor sex work (p. 76). The material benefit offences do not apply 
in instances of legitimate living arrangements, legal or moral obligations to the person receiving 
the benefit from the sex work, or if the service or good offered to a sex worker in exchange for 
payment would be offered to any member of the general public (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 
286.2(4); as cited in Stewart, 2016, p. 77). This offence may be considered void for vagueness as 
it is unclear what a “legitimate living arrangement” or a “moral obligation” is in a legal context. 
But the uncommon success of vagueness challenges means the courts will be likely to provide 
broad interpretation of these terms (pp. 77-78). 
Additionally, the material benefit offence makes it so a sex worker is unable to hire a 
receptionist, accountant, bodyguard, or even rent property to conduct their work. S. 286.2(5)(e) 
grants exceptions to the material benefit offence so long as the person receiving the benefit is not 
receiving it in the context of a commercial enterprise. A landlord renting a property to a sex 
worker would be guilty because they would be receiving benefit in a commercial context, and a 
similar issue arises for services such as receptionists and bodyguards. This suggests the only 
lawful way for indoor sex work to be conducted, is if a sex worker buys and owns their own 
property, while operating and running their business practice entirely by themselves (Stewart, 
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2016, p. 78). This seems to indicate that sex workers are largely prohibited from operating 
indoors as purchasing their own place to conduct these services may be difficult, given the 
number of systemic and structural barriers to other meaningful employment they may 
experience. 
The narrowed communicating law’s validity is based on the validity of the new sex work 
law as a whole. Therefore, Stewart does not consider its defects separately (2016, p. 79). The 
clash between the two policy objectives creates a potentially valid constitutional argument. The 
contradiction causes the law to be arbitrary or grossly disproportionate in terms of s. 7, 
regardless of the effectiveness of the law in achieving either objective (p. 86). 
Stewart (2016) analyzes and critiques the clash between the two policy objectives: 
It is possible that Bill C-36 will succeed in its objective of discouraging sex work, that 
it will have no effect whatsoever, or that it will in practice aggravate the insecurity of 
sex workers by driving sex work outdoors. The last possibility is by far the most likely. 
There is little in the history of sex work to suggest that criminalizing it is an effective 
means of preventing it. The crucial findings of fact in Bedford were that street-level sex 
work is dangerous and that sex work from a fixed indoor location, with the assistance 
of staff, is the safest. … Bill C-36 does little or nothing to make indoor sex work lawful 
and, by expanding the criminalization of communicating by clients, makes outdoor sex 
work harder too. These effects would be inconsistent with the second purpose of Bill C-
36. That would suggest, in turn, that Bill C-36 violated section 7. (Stewart, 2016, p. 86) 
In an attempt to highlight some of the other issues that may arise from the enforcement of 
Bill C-36, it is useful to turn to commentary provided regarding the enforcement of the Nordic 
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model of sex work regulation. It is interesting to note that Chu and Glass’ (2013) article was 
written before the enactment of Bill C-36. While Bill C-36 has been compared to the Nordic 
model already, the parallels between the two laws raises the question as to why Parliament 
decided to take this legislative approach despite the already demonstrated issues. 
In 1999, the Swedish government, under influence from anti-prostitution feminist 
discourse, enacted a law that criminalized individuals who purchase sex (Chu & Glass, 2013, p. 
103). This law was created without input from sex workers themselves and was presented as a 
means to achieve “gender equality”. Punishment could range from a fine to a maximum of one 
year of imprisonment under the Penal Code of Sweden. The law operates from the perspective 
that all men are aggressors, and all women are victims, sex work is clumped together with sex 
trafficking. 
The law has the added effect of making male and transgender sex workers invisible (Chu 
& Glass, 2013, p. 104). The Swedish law criminalizes individuals who allow sex workers to use 
their premises for the purpose of sex work (as it is said to encourage sex work), forcing sex 
workers to lie in order to rent places to stay (p. 104). The law has been critiqued as allowing 
violence against sex workers to continue, and for creating barriers to sex workers accessing HIV 
related prevention and care (p. 105). Since the law came into effect, sex workers operating on the 
streets have reported increased instances of violence (p. 106). Regular clients steer away for fear 
of being criminalized, but drunk and violent potential clients remain. This also has had the effect 
of reducing a sex worker’s agency in negotiating with clients, as they are essentially forced to 
provide riskier services for lower prices. Sex workers have been forced to seclude themselves 
when conducting their services, and informal networks where colleagues could warn each other 
of potential violent clients have diminished. Additionally, clients who may have been willing to 
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report instances of violence in support of sex workers are less likely to do so for fear of 
criminalization (p. 106). 
Police enforcement of the law has been described as aggressive, with instances of police 
harassment, persecution at the hands of police, and the general mistrust of the police taking place 
(Chu & Glass, 2013, p. 106). In Canada, the amendments made by Bill C-36 have created 
increased fears of the police. Jenn Clamen, co-ordinator of the Canadian Alliance for Sex Work 
Law Reform has said that criminalizing any part of sex work creates and promotes antagonism 
with the police, causing sex workers to avoid the police even in instances where violence or 
exploitation is taking place (Silliker, 2017, “Amendments”, paras. 21, 23-24). 
Beth, a street based sex worker who had participated in research conducted by POWER 
(Prostitutes of Ottawa-Gatineau Work Educate & Resist) provides the following account of an 
interaction with a police officer: 
I was just coming out of an alley; I had just been raped. I had been hit over my head 
with a brick. My head was gushing blood. I flagged a cop and he told me to call my own 
fucking ambulance… and he told me he had no time for me. Then he left, I couldn’t 
even walk. (as cited in Silliker, 2017, “Amendments”, paras. 26-27). 
So even though both the Swedish and Canadian laws are presented as having the 
intention of creating equality for sex workers and protecting people on the basis of gender, 
stigma still exists and negative perceptions and treatments of sex workers by police are present. 
In fact, Swedish sex workers have reported increased stigma from healthcare and social work 
service providers, anti-prostitution activists, and the general public (Chu & Glass, 2013, p. 107). 
SEX WORK IN CANADA  37 
 
So, the laws may appear to be beneficial and appropriate in theory, yet in practice there is so 
much stigma that prevents sex workers from accessing the support they may require. 
Why Legalize? 
 There are a variety of arguments for or against the decriminalization of prostitution. 
Instead of focusing too much attention on the arguments centred on morality, Shrage (2006) 
presents an interesting argument in favor of decriminalization. The argument begins by 
criticizing the idea that prostitution would disappear if other issues related to moral decay were 
to disappear. Prostitution is not merely a single thing (defined as a “… unitary social 
phenomenon with a particular origin…”), rather it is a complex phenomenon with many different 
elements associated with it (p. 240). 
Arguments made in favor of decriminalization can be made in the context of worker and 
labourer rights, and the respect and dignity that should be given to low-status work (Shrage, 
2006, p. 241). Shrage asks if the legal structures designed to supress and denounce prostitution 
(including voluntary participation) are oppressive to women. Women who are or are suspected of 
being sex workers (typically women of colour of low socio-economic status) are stigmatized, this 
stigma plays a role in making sex workers more vulnerable to hate crimes, housing and 
employment discrimination, and other human rights violations. Shrage highlights the irony of the 
mentality that legalizing prostitution will cause more prostitution and more “inherent” violation 
of women and children, thus making it acceptable for brutal legal suppression to continue. The 
regulation of sex business practices is more likely to reduce exploitation (p. 242). 
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She summarizes this argument rather succinctly: 
If businesses that provide customers with personal sexual services could operate legally, 
then they would be subject to the same labor regulations that apply to other businesses… 
Such businesses would not be allowed to treat workers like slaves, hire underage 
workers, deprive them of compensation for which they contracted, or expose them to 
unnecessary risks. The businesses could be required to enforce health and safety codes, 
provide workers with a minimum income and health insurance, and allow them to form 
collectives to negotiate for improved working conditions, compensations, and benefits. 
(Shrage, 2006, p. 243) 
Shrage rejects the slippery slope argument of “if we allow this, then what’s next?” and 
argues that if supporting the sale of sex (with some limitations) would protect the rights of those 
purchasing and making the choice to sell, then that becomes the appropriate “what’s next” 
scenario to consider (2006, p. 243). She concedes that treating the sex trade industry like other 
industries would not result in a perfect situation (underpaid labour, exploitation, unmet needs 
may still exist), but it would result in an improved one (p. 244). 
Indeed, it is suggested that instead of opposing prostitution, it would be more prudent to 
support human rights. Such as the right to be protected under the law from harm (rape, violence, 
etc.) or perhaps the harms associated with labour in general (Butcher, 2003, p. 1983). The harms 
sex workers experience when working are not limited to sexual health. In fact, many sex workers 
are well versed in protecting their sexual health, as their bodies are the tool they use for their 
trade. Things such as arthritis, gastrointestinal problems, mental and emotional health related 
issues (issues that people working in sectors other than the sex trade experience) are argued to 
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stem from the stigma and stress from being marginalized as sex workers (Silliker, 2017, “Other 
OHS issues”, paras. 1-6). 
Regarding the presence of the criminal laws themselves, it is questioned why existing 
criminal laws (against nuisance, homicide, assault, extortion, etc.) are not sufficient enough to 
address the harms associated with prostitution. It is questioned why there needs to be sex worker 
specific laws (Hudson & Meulen, 2013, p. 124). Another flaw with sex work specific laws is 
offered in the critique that Bill C-36 does not protect sex workers from exposure to violence 
unrelated to sexual transactions; violence committed by someone other than the client or a third 
party to the transaction (presumably pimps or those in exploitative relationships with the sex 
worker) (Galbally, 2016, p. 24). 
Arguments against decriminalization or legalization that are based on morality are weak. 
Arguments such as the slippery slope argument, or the “would you want your daughter to be a 
sex worker?” argument are meant to present those in support of sex work legalization as 
hypocrites (Shrage, 2006, p. 246). But when there is evidence to suggest that regulation under a 
criminal law scheme causes more harm, or that this type of regulation does little to make 
meaningful change; these finger pointing arguments intended to expose hypocrisy are a waste of 
time. Indeed, the Nordic model in Sweden has had the effect of displacing instances of sex work, 
as opposed to reducing them (Chu & Glass, 2013, p. 114). 
This raises the question of what the actual intention of criminal models are for regulation 
of sex work. If one is to take to heart the words of Senator Plett referred to earlier, then the intent 
is not to protect sex workers, but to eradicate sex work entirely. Why? If one is to take to heart 
the anti-prostitution feminist perspective, then it is because it is inherently dangerous and 
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exploitative to women. Is this true? Potentially. But this approach still has the effect of 
minimizing the decisions women make for themselves, which is counter to feminist notions of 
respecting women’s agency. Is it that sex work is inherently damaging? Or is it that it is 
unsightly to look at, so displacing sex work underground is considered a positive effect? 
This leads to the question of if Bill C-36 actually intends to combat prostitution? Or if it 
actually intends to treat it as a nuisance similar to how the old laws did but under the false 
pretense of denouncing prostitution? Conjecture aside, if one is to agree with the argument 
presented by Stewart (2016), then these laws are likely to be challenged under the Charter, and if 
the courts agree that the laws are unconstitutional, it would become the government’s duty to 
craft new laws once more. It would seem prudent for the government to consult the experts and 
the research that reflects the reality of sex work in making their decisions, as opposed to being 
guided by “utopic” notions of how to rid Canada of sex work. Just as the government needs to 
include Indigenous voices in its approach to reconciliation, the government must also include the 
voices of sex workers in discussions around sex work regulation. People who are affected 
primarily by these decisions need to have their voices heard. 
Conclusion 
 Through two Supreme Court decisions, the constitutionality of the old sex work laws 
were challenged. Different arguments were presented, and s. 7 jurisprudence was in different 
stages of evolution. It was ultimately determined that the laws had a negative effect on sex 
worker’s security of the person interests protected under s. 7. The Canadian government 
responded by enacting legislation, claiming the legislation had a different objective than the old 
laws did. Advocates, experts, and activist groups spoke on the problems with the new laws. 
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Research examining legal frameworks similar to Bill C-36 also highlighted issues. Regardless, 
the government went ahead, perhaps influenced by the claims of the moral crusade against 
prostitution. Harms with the new laws have been established, and it has been suggested that the 
laws themselves will be vulnerable to Charter challenges. While focusing on the buyers and not 
the sellers, the laws still have negative effects on sex worker’s security of the person. Their 
displacement, the difficulty in conducting sex work indoors (demonstrated to be the safest form 
of sex work), the antagonistic relationship with law enforcement; these are just a few of the 
harms that have been established. Future governments should take heed not to repeat these 
mistakes in the event that Bill C-36 is repealed by the courts. Just because the appeal process 
exists to remedy unjust laws, exposing Canadian sex workers to unjust laws is still unacceptable. 
The appeal process should be used as a worst-case scenario, not as a safety net for poor law 
making. 
 Examining these arguments bring to mind a few questions. First, if it is the courts that are 
the legal experts, why is it Parliament that is responsible for crafting laws. Laws that may be 
unconstitutional, or influenced by the political whims of the day? Second, are Charter arguments 
entirely bound by stated legislative objective? If Bill C-36’s stated objective was simply the 
eradication of prostitution (not in conjunction with the objective of responding to Bedford), 
would these laws be found to be unconstitutional? Do law makers have the power to safeguard 
their laws by drafting them against the backdrop of weighty objectives? Third, for divisive issues 
such as prostitution, abortion, or same-sex marriage, is there room for morality to be considered 
in the making of laws to regulate these issues? It is likely safe to say that crimes such as murder 
can be universally agreed upon to be immoral. But for other issues that have strong conflicting 
opinions, do these opinions have a place in law formation? Or should they be bound solely by 
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empirical evidence that reflect reality and not idyllic notions of right and wrong? Does the 
political aspect of law-making cause more problems than it solves? 
 These philosophical, sociological, and legal questions are beyond the scope of this paper. 
They may be nothing more than the musings of someone who has crafted their own opinions 
about these issues in response to reading related literature. Not being a legal expert, it is 
impossible to provide meaningful answers to these questions. But perhaps these questions may 
be the focus of future research. When the answers to these questions have profound effects on 
the lives of Canadians, perhaps they are still important questions. Regardless, a simple fact still 
remains; sex workers are people and deserve the same rights as everyone else. Regardless of 
what different sects of morality may say.  
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